Corporate entrepreneurship: Linking strategic roles to multiple dimensions of performance

Using data from a large European financial services firm which engaged in an entrepreneurial initiative to enhance its competitiveness, this paper explores the strategic role of middle managers in the context of corporate entrepreneurship and its link to multiple dimensions of performance. The findings indicate that middle managers’ role can be decomposed along four reliable and stable dimensions that are consistent with those suggested by the literature. Building on a stakeholder approach, the paper relates the identified roles to multiple dimensions of performance, namely to financial performance, customer satisfaction and employee satisfaction. Canonical correlation analysis –a useful and powerful method to explore relations among multidimensional variables– indicates a significant but weak relationship.corporate entrepreneurship; strategic roles; middle managers;

Framing and stakes: A survey study of decisions under uncertainty

Using a survey study of 261 decisions under uncertainty, we explore the factors that explain risk taking behavior and those that predict the importance of a decision. We also examine the relationship between framing and status quo, the similarity between monetary and non-monetary decisions, as well as the similarities and differences among our three subject groups (Undergraduates, MBAs and Executives). We find that framing, domain, and probability of success have a strong influence on the probability of taking risks. Other factors, such as group, importance of a decision, and whether the consequences are monetary or not, do not seem to influence risk attitudes. Our analysis of importance of a decision highlights the frequency with which a decision is taken as a key variable. Our results suggest that the cumulative effects of unimportant and frequent decisions are greater than the cumulative effects of very important and infrequent decisions.Decision making under uncertainty; Framing; Importance and frequency of decisions;

Nerve sheath tumor, benign neurogenic slow-growing solitary neurilemmoma of the left ulnar nerve: A case and review of literature

This paper represent a report of a case with ulnar nerve schwannoma(neurilemmoma), benign neurogenic slow-growing, tumors originating from Schwann cells along the course of a nerve (1) (2) (3). Schwannomas are the most common tumors of the peripheral nerves which occur in the adults (0.8–2%) (5). Usually they progress slowly and so they can remain painless swellings for a few years before other symptoms appear. Most of these lesions could be diagnosed clinically, are mobile in the longitudinal plane along the course of the involved nerve but not in the transverse plane (7). EMG, MRI, and ultrasonography are useful tools in the diagnosis. The definitive treatment of benign peripheral nerve schwannomatosis is complete enucleation of the tumor mass without damaging the intact nerve fascicles followed by confirmatory hystopathological examination (12). We present the case of a 62 years old right hand-dominant female who notice a slow increasing bulge over the inner aspect of her distal volar left forearm superior to the wrist, for a longer period of time not exactly specified; this was tracked and associated by pain, tingling and numbness over inner one and half fingers of her left hand in progress until the presentations. A diagnosis of soft-tissue tumor was presumed clinically. The other investigations were ultrasonography (US), nerve conduction studies (NCSs) such as sensory nerve action potential (SNAP) and compound muscle action potential (CMAP). In this case IRM was suggestive of a benign growth in her left ulnar nerve in the forearm region. Microsurgical techniques were used for ample enucleation of the tumor the distal volar left forearm. Subsequent histopathological examination confirmed the presumed diagnosis of a benign cellular schwannoma. At her last follow-up one month after surgery, the patient was neurological gradually improving sensory and motor function and she is highly satisfied with the results of surgery

Voting and information aggregation. Theories and experiments in the tradition of condorcet

Esta tesis ofrece una justificación para el uso de la pluralidad como una manera óptima de agregar información en las sociedades compuestas por individuos con intereses comunes pero con información diversa. El motivo de esta tesis es seguir una línea de investigación sobre la elección social que se remonta al matemático y filósofo político francés Jean-Antoine-Nicolas de Caritat, Marqués de Condorcet (1743-1794). En su Essai sur l'application de l'analyse à la probabilité des decisions rendues à la pluralité des voix (1785), Condorcet afirmó que se garantizaría la justicia social si las naciones adoptaran constituciones políticas que facilitaran el juicio correcto del grupo y argumentó que la votación por mayoría sería la herramienta constitucional más probable para alcanzar este objetivo.Siguiendo esta línea de investigación, la primera parte de esta tesis estudia las condiciones bajo las cuales la pluralidad proporciona a la sociedad el método más adecuado para llegar a decisiones de grupo. Aquí, como en el estudio de Condorcet, supondremos que los votantes actúan honradamente.El desarrollo natural de la teoría de votación, que ha introducido los temas de incentivos e interacción estratégica en la toma de decisiones de grupos, ha sido utilizado para cuestionar la suposición de votación honesta. Austen-Smith y Banks (1996) fueron los primeros en observar que la combinación de información privada e intereses comunes en el sistema propuesto por Condorcet podría crear incentivos para los votantes para actuar estratégicamente. Esta observación les condujo a plantear si la votación honesta sería compatible con el comportamiento de equilibrio de Nash en el juego inducido por la mayoría. La segunda parte de esta tesis expone esta problemática estudiando el comportamiento de los votantes en el juego inducido por la pluralidad.El interés en las instituciones del mundo real, para las cuales la votación es un elemento importante, ha hecho plantear desde hace tiempo la cuestión de si los votantes se comportan tal y como pronostican los modelos teóricos. Otra cuestión ha sido cómo tratar la complejidad del entorno estratégico. La segunda parte de esta tesis pide respuestas a estas preguntas. Puesto que la literatura sobre experimentos de votación parece proporcionar respuestas razonables a estas preguntas, la tercera parte de esta tesis utiliza experimentos de laboratorio para verificar las implicaciones de la segunda parte.This thesis offers a justification for the use of plurality rule as an optimal way to aggregate information for societies composed of individuals with common interests but diverse information. The motivation of this thesis follows a line of research in social choice that dates back to the French mathematician and political philosopher Jean-Antoine-Nicolas de Caritat, Marquis de Condorcet (1743-1794). In his Essai sur l'application de l'analyse à la probabilité des decisions rendues à la pluralité des voix (1785), Condorcet posited that social justice would be secured if nations would adopt political constitutions that facilitate accurate group judgments, and argued that the majority rule would be the most likely constitutional tool to achieve this goal.Following this line of research, the first part of this thesis discusses the conditions under which plurality rule provides the society with the most likely method to reach accurate group judgments. In this part, as in Condorcet's work, it is assumed that voters act honestly. Natural developments in the theory of voting, that brought in the issues of incentives and strategic interaction in group decision making, were used to challenge the assumption of honest voting. Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) were the first to notice that the combination of private information and common interests in the framework proposed by Condorcet might create an incentive for voters to act strategically. This observation led them to ask the question of whether honest voting is compatible with the Nash equilibrium behavior in the game induced by majority rule. The second part of this thesis advances this problematic by studying voters' behavior in the game induced by plurality rule.The interest in real-world institutions, for which voting is an important element, raised for some time the question of whether voters behave as predicted by the theoretical models. Another question was of how to deal with the complexity of the strategic environment. The second part of this thesis calls for answers to these types of questions. Since the literature on voting experiments seems to provide reasonable answers to these questions, the third part of this thesis uses laboratory experiments to test the implications of the second part

Voting and information aggregation : theories and experiments in the tradition of Condorcet /

Consultable des del TDXA portada: IDEATítol obtingut de la portada digitalitzadaEsta tesis ofrece una justificación para el uso de la pluralidad como una manera óptima de agregar información en las sociedades compuestas por individuos con intereses comunes pero con información diversa. El motivo de esta tesis es seguir una línea de investigación sobre la elección social que se remonta al matemático y filósofo político francés Jean-Antoine-Nicolas de Caritat, Marqués de Condorcet (1743-1794). En su Essai sur l'application de l'analyse à la probabilité des decisions rendues à la pluralité des voix (1785), Condorcet afirmó que se garantizaría la justicia social si las naciones adoptaran constituciones políticas que facilitaran el juicio correcto del grupo y argumentó que la votación por mayoría sería la herramienta constitucional más probable para alcanzar este objetivo. Siguiendo esta línea de investigación, la primera parte de esta tesis estudia las condiciones bajo las cuales la pluralidad proporciona a la sociedad el método más adecuado para llegar a decisiones de grupo. Aquí, como en el estudio de Condorcet, supondremos que los votantes actúan honradamente. El desarrollo natural de la teoría de votación, que ha introducido los temas de incentivos e interacción estratégica en la toma de decisiones de grupos, ha sido utilizado para cuestionar la suposición de votación honesta. Austen-Smith y Banks (1996) fueron los primeros en observar que la combinación de información privada e intereses comunes en el sistema propuesto por Condorcet podría crear incentivos para los votantes para actuar estratégicamente. Esta observación les condujo a plantear si la votación honesta sería compatible con el comportamiento de equilibrio de Nash en el juego inducido por la mayoría. La segunda parte de esta tesis expone esta problemática estudiando el comportamiento de los votantes en el juego inducido por la pluralidad. El interés en las instituciones del mundo real, para las cuales la votación es un elemento importante, ha hecho plantear desde hace tiempo la cuestión de si los votantes se comportan tal y como pronostican los modelos teóricos. Otra cuestión ha sido cómo tratar la complejidad del entorno estratégico. La segunda parte de esta tesis pide respuestas a estas preguntas. Puesto que la literatura sobre experimentos de votación parece proporcionar respuestas razonables a estas preguntas, la tercera parte de esta tesis utiliza experimentos de laboratorio para verificar las implicaciones de la segunda parte.This thesis offers a justification for the use of plurality rule as an optimal way to aggregate information for societies composed of individuals with common interests but diverse information. The motivation of this thesis follows a line of research in social choice that dates back to the French mathematician and political philosopher Jean-Antoine-Nicolas de Caritat, Marquis de Condorcet (1743-1794). In his Essai sur l'application de l'analyse à la probabilité des decisions rendues à la pluralité des voix (1785), Condorcet posited that social justice would be secured if nations would adopt political constitutions that facilitate accurate group judgments, and argued that the majority rule would be the most likely constitutional tool to achieve this goal. Following this line of research, the first part of this thesis discusses the conditions under which plurality rule provides the society with the most likely method to reach accurate group judgments. In this part, as in Condorcet's work, it is assumed that voters act honestly. Natural developments in the theory of voting, that brought in the issues of incentives and strategic interaction in group decision making, were used to challenge the assumption of honest voting. Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) were the first to notice that the combination of private information and common interests in the framework proposed by Condorcet might create an incentive for voters to act strategically. This observation led them to ask the question of whether honest voting is compatible with the Nash equilibrium behavior in the game induced by majority rule. The second part of this thesis advances this problematic by studying voters' behavior in the game induced by plurality rule. The interest in real-world institutions, for which voting is an important element, raised for some time the question of whether voters behave as predicted by the theoretical models. Another question was of how to deal with the complexity of the strategic environment. The second part of this thesis calls for answers to these types of questions. Since the literature on voting experiments seems to provide reasonable answers to these questions, the third part of this thesis uses laboratory experiments to test the implications of the second part

A Survey Study of Factors Influencing Risk Taking Behavior in Real World Decisions under Uncertainty

Con el objetivo de investigar la toma de decisiones bajo incertidumbre en el mundo real, hemos suministrado un cuestionario a 261 sujetos en el que nos describen una decisión real reciente. Dicha descripción incluye varias dimensiones de la misma, como el encuadre de pérdidas o ganancias (framing), el statu quo, el dominio y el tipo de consecuencia. El estudio demuestra que cuando se trata de una decisión entre algo seguro y algo arriesgado, se cumple la predicción de la teoría de prospectos de que un encuadre como pérdidas aumenta la propensión a tomar riesgos. Los resultados también indican que el dominio de la decisión es un factor que influye en la propensión a tomar riesgos. Las actitudes ante el riesgo no varían según el grupo de estudio o de si el tipo de consecuencia es monetario o no. Finalmente, mientras que el statu quo influye en establecer el punto de referencia, es el punto de referencia, y no el statu quo, el que afecta a la propensión al riesgo

A Survey Study of Factors Influencing Risk Taking Behavior in Real World Decisions under Uncertainty

With the goal of investigating decision making under uncertainty in real world decisions, we conduct a survey requiring 261 subjects to describe recent real life decisions and to answer questions about several dimensions of a decision, including framing, status quo, domain, and type of consequences. The study shows that when real world decisions are framed as choices between a sure outcome and a risky alternativea key prediction of Prospect Theory holds, namely, that a losses framing increases risk taking behavior. The results also provide support for the need to include the domain of a decision as a factor influencing risk taking behavior. Risk attitudes do not vary across the three groups considered and do not depend on whether the type of consequences are monetary or not. While we observe that status quo has some influence in setting the framing, we confirm that framing, and not status quo, is the driver of the risk attitude.Real world decisions, risk taking behavior, framing, domain, type of consequence, status quo.